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Examining the Trump Administration’s Transgender Service Ban
through an International Human Rights Law Framework
MATTHEW J. LANG*
INTRODUCTION
Six months after his inauguration as President of the United States, in a July
2017 tweet, U.S. President Donald J. Trump announced his administration’s plan
to ban openly transgender individuals from serving in the United States’ Armed
Forces (hereinafter the “transgender service ban”).1 This decision reverses a 2016
Obama administration decision permitting openly transgender persons to serve in
the U.S. military.2 Later, Trump formalized his order, issuing a Presidential
Memorandum on August 25, 2017.3 “First, the Memorandum indefinitely extends
a prohibition against transgender individuals entering the military, a process
formally referred to as “accession” . . . . Second, the Memorandum requires the
military to authorize, by no later than March 23, 2018, the discharge of
transgender service members.”4 The memorandum singles out the costs of
providing healthcare to transgender service members as a primary catalyst of the
order, with a specific focus on care related to sexual transition.5 This memorandum
Copyright © 2018 by Matthew J. Lang
* J.D. Duke University School of Law, May 2018; B.A. Psychology, Political Science with a Concentration
in Legal Studies, Sociology, Minor Gender Studies, summa cum laude, 2015.
1. Complaint at 2, Karnoski v. Trump (W.D. Wash. 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-1297), http://law
professors.typepad.com/files/karnoski_us_20170828_complaint.pdf See also Derek Hawkins, Trump’s
Tweets Come Back to Bite Him in Court Again, This Time in Transgender Military Case, THE WASHINGTON
POST (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/10/31/trumpstweets-come-back-to-bite-him-in-court-again-this-time-in-transgender-militarycase/?utm_term=.418a68aadbf3; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Jul. 26, 2017, 5:55 am),
https://twitter.com/ realdonaldtrump/status/890193981585444864?lang=en (“After consultation with
my Generals and military experts, please be advised that the United States Government will not accept
or allow . . .); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Jul. 26, 2017, 6:04 am),
https://twitter.com/ realdonaldtrump/status/890196164313833472?lang=en (Transgender individuals to
serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military.”).
2. Complaint at 2, Karnoski v. Trump (W.D. Wash. 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-1297).
3. Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland
Security, Military Service by Transgender Individuals (Aug. 25, 2017), available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/25/presidential-memorandum-secretarydefense-and-secretary-homeland. (Note that document was not included in the Federal Register).
4. Doe 1 v. Trump, Civil Action No, 17—1597 (CKK), 2017 WL 4873042, 1 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2017).
5. See Presidential Memorandum supra note 3, §§ 1 & 2(b) (“[T]he previous Administration failed
to identify a sufficient basis to conclude that terminating the Departments’ longstanding policy and
practice would not hinder military effectiveness and lethality, disrupt unit cohesion, or tax military
resources . . . Accordingly, . . . The Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security with
respect to the U.S. Coast Guard, shall . . . halt all use of DoD or DHS resources to fund sex reassignment
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has been challenged in United States Courts, with mixed success.6 In December
2017, the Trump administration’s Department of Justice appealed at least one of
the District Court rulings enjoining the transgender service ban and requested an
emergency stay on implementation of the court’s ruling, which was denied,
allowing transgender persons to begin enlisting in the armed forces in January
2018.7
As litigation concerning the transgender service ban proceeds in U.S. Federal
Courts,8 it is worth exploring alternate forums within which the ban may be
challenged. This is so because of the state of domestic constitutional law in relation
to transgender status,9 and the strength of presidential powers over national
security and the military.10 The international human rights law framework
provides advocates with an alternate body of law, and alternate forums,
including—most importantly—treaty monitoring bodies [TMBs], through which

surgical procedures for military personnel, except to the extent necessary to protect the health of an
individual who has already begun a course of treatment to reassign his or her sex.”).
6. See e.g. id. (granting in part, and denying in part Plaintiffs’ motion to preliminarily enjoin the
Trump administration’s policy, and granting in part, and denying in part the United States
Government’s motion to dismiss); Stone v. Trump, Civil Action No. MJG—17—2459, 2017 WL 5589122
(D. Md. Nov. 21, 2017); see also Karnoski v. Trump, Case No. C17-01297MJP, 2017 WL 5668071 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 27, 2017) (granting motion by the State of Washington to intervene). But see Williamson v.
Trump, 7:17-cv-01490-LSC, 2017 W.L. 4536419 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 11, 2017) (dismissing Plaintiff’s claim
without prejudice).
7. Chris Johnson, DOJ Appeals Ruling Against Trump’s Transgender Military Ban, WASHINGTON
BLADE (Nov. 21, 2017), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2017/11/21/doj-appeals-ruling-againsttrump/.
8. On December 22, 2017, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the
Trump administration’s emergency request for a stay pending appeal, see Doe 1 v. Trump, No. 17—
5267, 2017 WL 6553389 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2017), citing the administration’s failure to “satisf[y] the
stringent requirements for a stay pending appeal, as the rationale behind the denial. The Department
of Defense thereafter refused to appeal the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, clearing the way for transgender
recruits to enlist in the military in January 2018. See Lawrence Hurley, Idrees Ali, & REUTERS, US
Military to Accept Transgender Recruits after Justice Department Decides not to Appeal Court Ruling,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 29, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/transgender-recruits-allowed-toserve-in-military-2017-12. Media sources report however, that the Trump administration has not
entirely given up appealing the original ruling by the District Court holding the ban unconstitutional.
Id. (quoting “an anonymous Justice Department Official”) (“The Department of Defense has announced
that it will be releasing an independent study of these issues in the coming weeks. So rather than litigate
this interim appeal before that occurs, the administration has decided to wait for DOD’s study and will
continue to defend the president’s lawful authority in district court in the meantime.”). Therefore,
while the administration’s refusal to appeal the denial of the emergency stay pending appeal is a
positive sign that domestic litigation surrounding the transgender military ban is succeeding, it
remains to be seen whether the administration will later continue the appeal of the district court’s
original decision. In any event, examining alternate fora for advocacy challenging the transgender
service ban remains a worthwhile endeavor, if only to raise awareness about the overall status of
discrimination against transgender persons in the United States. The transgender service ban serves as
a prime example of the type of discrimination faced by transgender people, and using the
administration’s action as demonstrative of such discrimination may force action on other fronts of
discrimination as well.
9. See infra notes 11-27.
10. See infra notes 28-34.
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challenges to the transgender service ban, and other forms of discrimination
against the transgender community—of which the transgender service ban is
highly exemplary—can be levied.
This paper will examine the applicability of international human rights law
to the transgender service ban, with the objective of determining the most effective
means of challenging the transgender service ban through the human rights
framework. First, I briefly examine United States constitutional law as it has been
applied to the transgender community, and law concerning presidential power
over military and national security matters. This discussion demonstrates how
domestic law, alone, may not be enough to derail the Trump administration’s plan
to ban transgender service. Second, I examine international human rights law,
with specific focus on the conventions, treaties, and customary law most apt to
provide for a successful challenge to the military service ban. Third, I examine how
international human rights law may be used to challenge the transgender service
ban, or other forms of state sanctioned discrimination against the transgender
community. Fourth, I conclude with an examination of why advocates should,
despite the challenges presented, pursue a challenge to the transgender service
ban under international human rights law.
I. UNITED STATES DOMESTIC LAW
A. Constitutional Challenges to Transgender Discrimination.
The U.S. Constitution provides legal advocates with tools that can be used to
challenge unequal treatment under the law,11 as well as any denial of liberty or
property without due process of law.12 The Fifth Amendment was first used to
prohibit discrimination on the basis of a protected classification in Bolling v. Sharpe,
which dealt with racial discrimination in education in the District of Columbia.13
Expanding on the Brown v. Board doctrine, the Court, in Bolling held that the federal
government was required to ensure equal protection under the law, just as states
were required to so do under the Fourteenth Amendment.14 Later, in Reed v. Reed,
the Court struck down a state statute that discriminated on the basis of sex,
holding for the first time that sex-based discrimination violated the equal
protection guarantees in the Fourteenth Amendment.15
While the Court has never had an opportunity to decide a case challenging a
federal statute for discriminating on the basis of sex in violation of Fifth
Amendment equal protection guarantees, the Court’s decision in the 2015 case
United States v. Windsor, supports the general proposition that discrimination by
the federal government on the basis of sex violates Fifth Amendment equal

11. U.S. CONST. Amend. V; see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
12. U.S. CONST. Amend. V.
13. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that racial discrimination in schooling within
the District of Columbia violated Equal Protection guarantees inherent in the Vth Amendment’s Due
Process clause, which, as opposed to the XIV Amendment that only restricts actions taken by state
governments, applies to the Federal government).
14. Id.
15. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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protection and due process guarantees.16 In Windsor, the Court struck down
operative sections of the Defense of Marriage Act, which limited the validity of
marriage to heterosexual couples regardless of a state’s definition of marriage.17
The Court’s decision extends Fifth Amendment protections to same-sex couples
and demonstrates that Fifth Amendment equal protection extends beyond
protecting members of racial minorities.
However, recent Fourteenth Amendment challenges to state laws restricting
access to public facilities on the basis of transgender identity have not been
successful. In 2016, the Court effectively dismissed a high profile18 challenge to a
Virginia state school bathroom ordinance, which required that students use school
sex-segregated facilities that corresponded to their biological sex assigned at
birth.19 Following a change in executive guidance involving federal antidiscrimination statute Title IX, the Court remanded the challenge to the Fourth
Circuit where a preliminary injunction issued by the district court was ultimately
vacated.20 In August 2017, that case, G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board, was
again before the Fourth Circuit, where the district court’s first decision in the
case,21 which reserved decision on the equal protection challenge levied by the
plaintiff against the defendant school board, was remanded once more for a
determination about whether the entire challenge was rendered moot by the
plaintiff’s graduation from the defendant school system.22
Several district courts have held that heightened scrutiny applies to practices
challenged for discriminating against transgender status.23 But, consensus among
authoritative precedent remains elusive. Several U.S. courts of appeals have held
that transgender persons are protected from gender identity discrimination under
a sex-equality equal protection theory.24 Evaluating claims under a sex-equality
framework would lead to challenged government action being evaluated by courts

16. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2015).
17. Id. at 2695-96 (“The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains
within it the prohibition against denying to any person the equal protection of the laws. . . . By seeking
to displace [state protections] and treating [homosexual] persons as living in marriages less respected
than others, the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth Amendment”).
18. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bathroom Case Puts Transgender Student on National Stage, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/us/gavin-grimm-transgender-rights-bathroom.
html.
19. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 15-2056, 2016 4th Cir., certiorari granted, 137
S.Ct. 369 (2016), summary disposition granted, 137 S.Ct. 1239 (March 6, 2017) (summarily disposing
grant of certiorari by vacating and remanding case for reconsideration “in light of the guidance
document issued by the Department of Education and Department of Justice on February 22, 2017”).
20. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 853 F.3d 729 (4th Cir. Apr. 18, 2017) (granting “unopposed
motion to vacate preliminary injunction” of district court).
21. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F.Supp.3d 736 (E.D. Va. Sep. 17, 2015).
22. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 869 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. Aug. 2, 2017).
23. See e.g. Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F.Supp.3d 134, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Norsworthy v.
Beard, 87 F.Supp.3d 1104 (N.D. Calif. 2015); Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. United
States Dep’t of Educ., 208 F.Supp.3d 850 (S.D. Oh., 2016).
24. See e.g. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[D]iscrimination against
a transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination, whether it’s
described as being on the basis of sex or gender.”).
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under heightened scrutiny.25 However, given the substantial deference afforded to
the executive by courts evaluating decisions involving national security and the
military,26 it is unclear whether an equal protection challenge to the transgender
service ban would succeed. This is because hearing courts evaluate not only the
discriminatory acts challenged, but also the “important governmental objectives”
at play, under heightened scrutiny.27
B. Executive Power Over Matters Involving National Security and the Military
Military policies have historically been afforded a special degree of deference
by reviewing courts—noticeably more than that afforded to other policies
challenged for violating equal protection guarantees.28 In matters involving
national security and the military, “the Constitution itself requires special
deference” be afforded to decisions made by the legislature and the executive.29
“Aside from the Constitution itself, the need for deference also arises from the
unique role that national defense plays in a democracy.”30 Ultimately, courts will
defer to the political branches on matters involving national security and the
military because “the imprimatur of the President, the Congress, or both imparts
a degree of legitimacy to military decisions that courts cannot hope to
confer.”31Although this deference does not immunize decisions concerning
national security and the military from judicial review,32 “[t]he operation of a
healthy deference to legislative and executive judgments in the area of military
affairs is evident” in judicial hesitancy to consider challenges to decisions of the
political branches in this space.33

25. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (citations omitted) (“[T]he
party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the
burden of showing an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for the classification. . . . The burden is
met only by showing at least that the classification serves “important governmental objectives and that
the discriminatory means employed” are “substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.”).
26. See infra notes 28-34.
27. Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980).
28. See e.g. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (while upholding the validity of a
military policy banning service by homosexuals, holding: “[t]he special deference we owe the
military’s judgment necessarily affects the scope of the court’s inquiry into the rationality of the
military’s policy”).
29. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 927 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding an equal protection challenge
to the military policy banning service by homosexuals). See also id. at 925-26 (“National defense
decisions not only implicate each citizen in the most profound way. Such decisions also require policy
choices, which the legislature is equipped to make and the judiciary is not. . . . While Congress and the
President have access to intelligence and testimony on military readiness, the federal judiciary does
not. While Congress and the members of the Executive Branch have developed a practiced expertise
by virtue of their day-to-day supervision of the military, the federal judiciary has not. The judiciary has
no Armed Services Committee, Foreign Relations Committee, Department of Defense, or Department
of State.”).
30. Id. at 925.
31. Id. at 926.
32. Id. at 927.
33. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 66 (1981) (upholding Congressional action excluding women
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Several of the judicial decisions referenced above may be considered
outdated, primarily because they address challenges to the long standing but since
repealed, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” excluded openly
gay persons from serving in the armed forces.34 While some time has passed since
these cases were decided, and the policy at issue has since been repealed, the cases
nonetheless reveal the level of judicial deference that would likely be afforded to
executive judgments about military service among members of transgender
community by reviewing courts. Absent Congressional action nullifying the
President’s transgender service ban,35 judicial review of the ban by appellate courts
under an equal protection framework has an acute risk of failure. That risk should
caution against an advocacy strategy exclusively focused on litigating the ban in
U.S. courts.
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW’S APPLICABILITY TO THE
TRANSGENDER SERVICE BAN
A. Applicability of Core Human Rights Treaties in the United States
The United States has ratified several core human rights conventions that
protect individual rights threatened by the transgender service ban. Among them
are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR],36 and the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment [CAT].37
Additionally, the United States government’s signatures of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR],38 and the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
[CEDAW],39 impose obligations on the United States to “refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and purpose of [those] treat[ies].”40 While this signatory
obligation—to refrain from conduct violative of the object and purpose of a
from draft registration).
34. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was ended by Congressional action and executive support in 2010.
See 10 U.S.C. § 654, (repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub.L. 111-321 § 2(f)(1)(A),
Stat. 3516 (Dec. 22, 2010)); see also Elisabeth Bumiller, Obama Ends ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Policy, N.Y.
TIMES (July 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/us/23military.html.
35. The legislative response to the transgender service ban was swift, but failed just as swiftly. See
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, Transgender Military Service, (accessed Dec. 10, 2017) (describing a
bipartisan amendment introduced in the Senate to protect against transgender troops being
discharged, and how Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell “ended debate before the amendment
was able to receive a vote.” Also discussing bipartisan bills introduced in the Senate and the House of
Representatives that would achieve the same end.)
36. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Oct. 5, 1977, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-20,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
37. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 24 I.L.M. 535.
38. International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights, Oct. 5, 1977, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
39. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979,
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 96-53, 19 I.L.M. 33.
40. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 92-1, U.C.
Conf. on the L. of Treaties—First and Second Sessions—Official Doc., UN SALES NO. E.70.V.5.
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treaty—is established by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,41 a
convention that remains unratified by the United States,42 scholars have noted that
customary international law norms nonetheless suggest the United States is bound
by the Convention’s obligations.43 “To the extent that Article 18 does reflect
customary international law, the signing obligation would apply even to States
that have not ratified the Vienna Convention.”44 For the purposes of the remainder
of this work, I will assume that as a matter of customary international law, Article
18 obligations under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties impose on the
United States obligations to not infringe upon the object and purpose of treaties to
which it is a signatory party.
B. Substantive Obligations under International Human Rights Instruments
1. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The ICCPR textually imposes negative obligations45 upon States that have
ratified the convention to not discriminate on the basis of “sex . . . or other status,”46
to ensure freedom from “torture, or . . . cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,”47

41. Id.
42. U.S. Dep’t of State, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (accessed Dec. 11, 2017),
https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (noting that while the United States has not ratified
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “[t]he United States considers many of the provisions
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to constitute customary international law on the law
of treaties.”); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 48
HARV. INT’L. L.J. 307, 315 n. 36 (2007) (citing commentary by U.S. government officials acknowledging
status of Article 18 as customary international law).
43. See CURTIS A. BRADLEY, Treaty Signature, 8 in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES (Duncan Hollis,
ed., Oxford University Press, 2012), available at https://scholarship.law.duke.edu /faculty_scholarship
/2463/ (citing Curtis A. Bradley supra note 40 at 315 n. 36 (citing “statements by U.S. officials suggesting
at various times that Article 18 reflects customary international law.”); BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES,
ANNE-MARIE LA ROSA, AND MAKANE MOISE MBENGUE, ‘Article 18’ in THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY (vol. 1, Oliver Corten and Pierre Klein, eds., Oxford University
Press, 2011); Paolo Palchetti, ARTICLE 18 OF THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION: A VAGUE AND INEFFECTIVE
OBLIGATION OR A USEFUL MEANS OF STRENGTHENING LEGAL COOPERATION? (in THE LAW OF TREATIES
BEYOND THE VIENNA CONVENTION, Enzo Cannizarro, ed., Oxford University Press, 2011); Mark E.
Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009)) (While
noting that “[i]t is not clear to what extent [Article 18] reflects customary international law[, and that
s]ome commentators contend that, at least at the time it was included in the [Vienna Convention on
the Law or Treaties] VCTL, it reflected progressive development rather than established state practice,”
arguing Article 18 and “the VCTL ha[ve] now been in force for many years and ha[ve] been ratified by
over 110 States, and even some countries that are not parties to it (such as the United States) appear to
accept that the obligation recited in Article 18 is now a matter of customary international law.”).
44. See id. at 8.
45. Bryan H. Druzin, Opening the Machinery of Private Order: Public International Law as a Form of
Private Ordering, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 423, 429 n. 17 (2014) (“The difference between positive and negative obligations, rather is that one requires inaction (negative obligations) and the other demands
action (positive obligations)”).
46. ICCPR, supra note 36, art’s. 2 & 26.
47. Id., art. 7.
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to ensure “the right to freedom of expression,”48 “the right to liberty and security
of person,”49 and the right [of every citizen], without any of the distinctions
mentioned [in the non-discrimination provision] and without unreasonable
restrictions . . . [t]o have access, on general terms equality, to public service in his
country.”50 Additionally, States Parties must ensure access to “an effective
remedy” for violations of rights under the convention.51
As interpreted in general comments and communication decisions issued by
the Human Rights Committee, the rights contained in the ICCPR protect against a
wider array of adverse State action than what the text of the provisions alone
imply. The rights to be free from discrimination contained in Articles 2 and 26 of
the ICCPR include the right of freedom from discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation,52 and the free-standing discrimination prohibition in Article 26
prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender identity.53 While sexual orientation
and gender identity remain distinct facets of personal identity,54 the Independent
Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender identity has noted that international law is increasingly
recognizing the right of individuals to be free from discrimination based on their
gender identities.55 Therefore, Article 2 would likely be interpreted to include a
prohibition on discrimination on the basis of gender identity and transgender
status, as well.
In General Comment 18, the Human Rights Council further notes that the
prohibitions against discrimination contained in ICCPR Articles 2 and 26 differ in

48. Id., art. 19.
49. Id., art. 9(1).
50. Id., art. 25(c).
51. Id., art. 2(3)(a).
52. Human Rights Committee Communication No. 488/1992, Toonen v. Australia, para. 8.7 (Mar.
21, 1994), available in SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE UNDER THE OPTIONAL
PROTOCOL (Vol. 5, 2005), http://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/sdecisions vol5en.pdf.
53. See Human Rights Committee Communication No. 2172/2012, G. v. Australia, para. 7.12 (June
28, 2017) (“In this context, the Committee observes that the prohibition against discrimination under
article 26 encompasses discrimination on the basis of marital status and gender identity, including
transgender status.”).
54. See Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/35/36, at 3 (Apr. 19,
2017),
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G17/095/53/PDF/G1709553.pdf?Open
Element (“Sexual orientation has an external dimension — it indicates a person’ s sexual inclination
and feelings towards others. Gender identity has an internal dimension — the term refers to how a
person self-identifies in regard to his or her own gender, which may be different from the gender
assigned at birth.”).
55. See id. at 8 (“As evidenced by the wide range of international human rights treaties that are in
force, international human rights bodies and procedures — ranging from the human rights treaty
bodies, with their general comments and recommendations, to the universal periodic review, to the
special procedures’ coverage of sexual orientation and gender identity-related violations, to resolutions
and studies — the international human rights system has been strengthening the promotion and
protection of human rights without distinction. The protection of persons based on their sexual
orientation and gender identity, and the mandate of the Independent Expert, are based on international
law, complemented and supplemented by State practice.”).
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applicability and the scope of the prohibitions contained within each.56 While
Article 2 of the ICCPR prohibits discrimination with respect to the rights and
privileges guaranteed in the remainder of the covenant, Article 26 is a freestanding right, which “prohibits discrimination in law or in fact in any field
regulated and protected by public authorities.”57 Discrimination “should be
understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is
based on any ground . . . and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal
footing, of all rights and freedoms.”58
Additionally, the right to be free from torture, or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment, contained in ICCPR Article 7 is understood to prohibit “not
only acts that cause physical pain but also . . . acts that cause mental suffering.”59
“The aim of the provisions of article 7 of the [ICCPR] is to protect both the dignity
and the physical and mental integrity of the individual.”60 The right to freedom of
expression in Article 19 has been interpreted to include a right of “commentary on
one’s own . . . affairs.”61 Importantly, the right to liberty and security of person in
Article 9 is understood to “concern[] freedom from injury to the body and the
mind, or bodily and mental integrity,”62 “proceeding from any governmental or
private actors.”63 The Human Rights Committee notes that this Article 9 guarantee
applies to “[e]veryone’ includ[ing], among others, . . . lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender persons.”64 Finally, the Human Rights Committee has interpreted that
the right of equal access to public service positions in Article 25(c) obligates States
to ensure “criteria for appointment . . . be objective and reasonable,” and further
imposes on States an affirmative obligation “to ensure that there is equal access to
public service for all citizens.”65
56. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Non-discrimination, General Comment No. 18 (37th Sess.
1989).
57. Id. at 3.
58. Id. at 2.
59. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Article 7 Prohibition of torture, or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, General Comment No. 20, at 1 (44th Sess. 1992).
60. Id.
61. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Article 19 Freedoms of opinion and expression, General
Comment No. 34, at 3 (102nd Sess. 2011) (citing Communication No. 1189/2003, Fernando v. Sri Lanka
(Mar. 31, 2005)).
62. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Article 9 Liberty and security of person, General Comment No.
35, at 1 (112th Sess. 2014).
63. Id. at 3.
64. Id. at 1.
65. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Article 25 The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights
and the right of equal access to public service, General Comment No. 25, at 1 (57th Sess. 1996). While
discrimination on the basis of access to public service seems largely based on political opportunity and
participation, in a recent speech to the Commission on the Status of Women, U.N. Secretary General
António Guterres stressed the importance of “open[ing] doors of opportunity for women and girls: in
classrooms and boardrooms, in military ranks, and at peace talks, in all aspects of productive life.” See
UNITED NATIONS, UN Commission on Status of Women Opens with Calls for More Men to Stand Up for
Equality, UN NEWS CENTRE (Mar. 13, 2017) (emphasis added) (quoting opening remarks by SecretaryGeneral António Guterres), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56343#.Wn37l-jwaUk.
Because the illegality of discrimination on the basis of sex in the military appears to have at least been
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There are significant limitations on the applicability of these principles to the
transgender service ban, however, because of the reservations, understandings,
and declarations filed by the United States government when it ratified the
ICCPR.66 Despite these concerns, the human rights framework remains important
in challenging the transgender service ban because of the alternate forums and
methods of challenging the ban’s legitimacy that exist because of international
human rights law.67
Ultimately, the transgender service ban discriminates against a group of
individuals on the basis of their status as transgender individuals, in violation of
the non-discrimination provisions of the ICCPR.68 Even absent discrimination on
the basis of a substantive civil or political rights protected by the ICCPR, the
convention’s Article 26 free-standing prohibition on discrimination on any basis,
including on the basis of transgender identity,69 involving “any field regulated . . .
by public authorities,”70 would create an actionable harm under the ICCPR among
transgender persons wanting to enlist in the U.S. armed forces. Additionally, given
that substantive rights protected by the ICCPR are being violated by the
transgender service ban, Article 2’s additional prohibition against discrimination
is also applicable here.71
Among the substantive protections being violated is ICCPR Article 7’s
prohibition against “torture, and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”72
Considering the serious impacts of transgender discrimination,73 the United States
government is infringing on its duties under Article 7 to “protect . . . the dignity .
. . and the mental integrity of the individual,” by actively excluding them from
military service74 Additionally, the transgender service ban infringes upon
individuals’ rights to “security of person” found in article 9 of the ICCPR.75 As
noted above, security of person “concerns freedom from injury to the . . . the mind
. . . and mental integrity,”76 and applies to all persons, with the Human Rights

contemplated by high-ranking U.N. officials, and because the U.S. government largely considers
voluntary service in the armed forces in the public service, see generally supra notes 30-33, Article 25(c)
of the ICCPR should not be dismissed as irrelevant to the present analysis.
66. See 136 Cong. Rec. S17486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Unanimous-Consent Agreement)
(Reserving the applicability of Article 7’s prohibition against torture as creating a binding obligation
only insofar as treatment falling under the purview of Article 7’s prohibitions would also be in violation
of Amendments VIII, V, or XIV to the United States Constitution and understanding Articles 2 and 26
to not prohibit discrimination when such discrimination is “at a minimum, rationally related to a
legitimate governmental objective.”).
67. See infra notes 146-58.
68. See supra notes 52-58.
69. See Human Rights Committee, supra note 53.
70. See Human Rights Committee, supra note 56.
71. See supra notes 52-58.
72. ICCPR, supra note 36, Art. 7.
73. Katherine Schreiber & Heather Hausenblas, Why Transgender People Experience More Mental
Health Issues, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.psychologytoday.com /blog/the-truthabout-exercise-addiction/201612/why-transgender-people-experience-more-mental-health.
74. See Human Rights Committee, supra notes 60-62.
75. ICCPR, supra note 36, Article 9.
76. See Human Rights Committee, supra note 62.
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Committee taking explicit note of its applicability to persons who identify as
transgender.77 Transgender persons who are subject to discrimination experience
significant psychological distress,78 which often has repercussions for their social
lives, and abilities to meaningfully contribute to society.79 The State mandated
discrimination required by President Trump’s transgender service ban further
stigmatizes a segment of the population that already experiences significant harms
because of discrimination. The additional harm that this ban imposes violates
international obligations under the ICCPR.
Furthermore, the rights to freedom of self-expression,80 and equal access to
public service,81 are infringed upon by the discriminatory impact of the
transgender service ban.82 The transgender service ban restricts a class of persons
from freely expressing their own identities, so long as they want to retain equal
access to the opportunity to serve their country in the armed forces. The military’s
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, which banned openly gay individuals from serving
in the military, had similar ramifications for freedom of expression.83 Persons may
choose to hide their gender identity in order to enlist in the armed services, but
would do so at the expense of their rights to freely express themselves, particularly
their right to freedom of expression concerning their own affairs.84 Further, the
transgender service ban explicitly prohibits a class of individuals from performing
a type of public service which is necessary to the adequate functioning of
American society.85 Prohibiting transgender individuals from enlisting in the
military, regardless of the rationale behind the ban, directly contravenes these
legal obligations imposed on the United States by the ICCPR.

77. See Human Rights Committee, supra notes 62-64.
78. Rebeca Robles, et al., Removing Transgender Identity from the Classification of Mental Disorders: A
Mexican Field Study for ICD-11, 3 LANCET PSYCHIATRY 850, 856 (2016), https://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S2215036616301651?via%3Dihub.
79. See id. (“Distress and dysfunction can occur in disapproving social environments and that
individuals with gender incongruence are at increased risk . . . social isolation, school dropout, loss of
employment, homelessness, disrupted interpersonal relationships, physical injuries, social rejection,
stigmatisation, victimisation, and violence.”).
80. ICCPR, supra note 36, Art. 19.
81. ICCPR, supra note 36, Art. 25(c).
82. ICCPR, supra note 36, Art. 2.
83. See Geoffrey W. Bateman & Claude J. Summers, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, glbtq, inc., at 1 (2015),
http://www.glbtqarchive.com/ssh/dont_ask_S.pdf (“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” appeared less
discriminatory because it did not allow the military to ask recruits about their sexual orientation when
they joined, thereby making it possible for closeted gays and lesbians to serve. Yet the moment service
members “told,” or made statements that remotely suggested they might be gay or lesbian, under
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the military had grounds to investigate and discharge them for being
homosexual or participating in homosexual sex.”) Similarly, the transgender service ban would—at
least—conceivably allow individuals who don’t reveal their sex non-conforming gender identities prior
to enlisting in the armed forces, to serve.
84. Human Rights Committee, supra note 61.
85. See Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 925 (“The need for deference also arises from the unique
role that national defense plays in a democracy.”); see also id. (“National defense decisions . . . implicate
each citizen in the most profound way.”).
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2. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment [CAT] prohibits “any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . for
any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official.”86 In addition, Article 2 of the covenant prohibits “a threat of war,” or any
other “exceptional circumstances” from being used “as a justification of torture.”87
Nor may “[a]n order from a superior officer or a public authority . . . be invoked
as a justification for torture.”88 Importantly, Article 16 of CAT proscribes
“treatment or punishment which do[es] not amount to torture as defined in Article
1, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”89
Upon ratification, the United States government filed with the United
Nations, an important series of limiting reservations to CAT’s provisions.
Specifically, the United States reserved consent to be bound by the CAT Article 16
prohibitions against acts that would constitute “cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment,” only insofar as such treatment would be prohibited by
the Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.90
Several CAT State Parties objected to this reservation,91 with one even arguing
that it is “incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.”92 As
established by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a reservation made
by a State in adopting a treaty is invalid if, among other reasons, it “is incompatible
with the object and purpose of the treaty.”93 However, absent a notable concern
that the reservation violates the object and purpose of the treaty, and arguably a
pronouncement by the International Court of Justice [ICJ] that the reservation is
incompatible,94 under the Vienna Convention, an objection to a reservation has the
86. CAT, supra note 37, art. 1(1).
87. Id. art. 2(1).
88. Id. art. 2(3).
89. Id., art. 16.
90. See 136 Cong. Rec. S17486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Unanimous-Consent Agreement).
91. Finland, With Regard to the Reservations, Understandings and Declarations Made by the United
States of America upon Ratification, filed Feb. 27, 1996; The Netherlands, With Regard to the Reservations,
Understandings and Declarations Made by the United States of America upon Ratification, filed Feb. 26, 1996;
Sweden, With Regard to the Reservations, Understandings and Declarations Made by the United States of
America upon Ratification, filed Feb. 27, 1996. See also Germany, notification to the Secretary-General (Feb.
26, 1996) (“it is the understanding of the Federal Republic of Germany that [the said reservations and
understandings] do not touch upon the obligations of the United States of America as a State Party to
the Convention.”). These objections are available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en].
92. The Netherlands, supra note 91.
93. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 40, art. 19(c).
94. See THE YALE L. J. COMP. INC., The Effect of Obligations to Treaty Reservations, 60 YALE L.J. 728,
734 n. 24 (1951) (arguing that the advisory ICJ opinion procedure should be utilized by the General
Assembly when questions concerning the object and purpose of a treaty arise in the context of treaty
reservations and objections to reservations.); see also Marko Milanovic & Linos-Alexander Sicilianos,
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effect of nullifying the agreement between the disagreeing State Parties to the
extent covered by the reservation.95 Therefore, while the impact of these objections
is likely limited, the effects of having called into question the United States’
reservations under CAT could have repercussive effects for non-litigation focused
advocacy at the Committee Against Torture.
Recently, CAT’s treaty monitoring body, the Committee Against Torture,
began to recognize laws that impose “preconditions to legal gender recognition”
as concerning, considering obligations arising under CAT.96 Commentators have
noted that the Committee’s recommendations on the applicability of CAT
protections to laws that discriminate against and harm the transgender
community, “may have wider implications for human rights litigation . . .
[because] the right to be free from torture is more absolute in nature, provides
more protection because there is less room for balancing against public interest,
and is more universally recognised and applicable.”97 These recommendations
were made in the Committee’s concluding observations on China’s fifth periodic
report, adopted in 2016.98 Specifically, the recommendations call upon China to
“[t]ake the necessary legislative, administrative and other measures to guarantee
respect for the autonomy and physical and personal integrity of . . . transgender
and intersex persons,” particularly in the context of forced conversion therapy,
and other “abusive treatment.”99 The limited scope of the committee’s
recommendations might caution against an advocacy strategy focused exclusively
on engaging U.N. bodies concerned with the implementation of international
norms around the prohibition against torture. It may be prudent, however, to call
for expanding the scope of CAT protections to include prohibitions on state
sanctioned discriminatory actions that have the effect of producing severe
psychological harm similar to that experienced by members of the transgender
community as a result of both state-sanctioned and private discrimination. Such
an amendment may be timely given the pushback challenges to transgender
discrimination face in domestic U.S. courts.
The transgender service ban—at least—implicates CAT prohibitions on
“cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment” contained in Articles 1 and 16 of the
Convention. As noted above in the discussion of ICCPR prohibitions on torture,
discrimination has a profound effect on the mental health and social functioning

Reservations to Treaties: An Introduction, 24 EUROPEAN J. OF INT’L. L. 1055 (2013) (describing the example
of reservations and objections to the Genocide Convention, and the ICJ’s role in determining the
validity of reservations).
95. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 21(1)(a); see also THE YALE L. J. COMP. INC.,
supra note 94.
96. Geoffrey Yeung, Using the Convention Against Torture to Advance Transgender and Intersex
Rights, OXFORD HUMAN RIGHTS HUB (May 26, 2016), http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/using-the-conventionagainst-torture-to-advance-transgender-and-intersex-rights/.
97. Id.
98. U.N. Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of China,
CAT/C/SR.1368 and 1371 (Feb. 3, 2016), http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?
enc=6QkG1d%2FPPRiCAqhKb7yhslEE2YuVt8GA5WKG3GEX%2BZEXqjnsVnWP%2BkQ6f9cmzWcE
PJYdFWEXvIFmDTE3WtKbIKZXAKr5OVTwnh86Q4GNZXSmrqMf55xyaMPMcFusW3o2.
99. Id. para. 56(a);(c).

Lang Macro word doc (Do Not Delete)

262 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

5/8/2018 9:06 PM

Volume 25:249 2018

of all persons, in particular members of the transgender community.100 Under an
expanded understanding of treatment prohibited by CAT—particularly “abusive
treatment”101 which has the effect of degrading the “autonomy . . . and personal
integrity of . . . transgender . . . persons,”102 the transgender service ban is in
violation of the United States’ CAT obligations. While the reservations to CAT
filed by the United States at the time of ratification no doubt complicate matters,
under an inclusive advocacy strategy,103 the CAT, and recent developments
around the Convention’s applicability to discrimination against members of the
transgender community, has a role to play in challenging the transgender service
ban.
3. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
[ICESCR] imposes positive obligations104 on State Parties to fulfil the myriad rights
guaranteed in the Covenant, including the right to work,105 “safe and healthy
working conditions,”106 “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health,”107 and imposes on State Parties
the obligation “to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant
will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to . . . sex . . . or other
status.”108 ICESCR also contains an independent clause obligating that states
“undertake to ensure . . . the equal right of men and women [to] the enjoyment of
all economic, social and cultural [ESC] rights set forth in” ICESCR.109
The Committee on ESC Rights interprets ICESCR’s non-discrimination
provision to protect against discrimination on the basis of gender identity, and
notes that transgender persons “often face serious human rights violations, such
as harassment in schools or in the workplace.”110 The Committee takes a strong
stance on the conceptual difference between sex and gender in its General
Comment number 16, concerning the Article 3 obligation to ensure equality
between men and women in the enjoyment of ESC rights.111

100. See supra notes 73-79.
101. See U.N. Committee Against Torture, supra note 98.
102. Id.
103. See infra notes 146-58.
104. For an explanation of the difference between positive and negative obligations under
international human rights law, see Bryan H. Druzin, supra note 45.
105. ICESCR, supra note 38, art. 6.
106. Id., art. 7.
107. Id., art. 12.
108. Id., art. 2(2).
109. Id., art. 3.
110. U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Non-discrimination in Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights), General Comment No. 20, para. 32 (42nd Sess. 2009).
111. U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 16, para. 14 (34th Sess. 2005).
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Additionally, the Committee interprets ICESCR’s Article 4 right to work
provision as “affirm[ing] the obligation of States parties to assure individuals their
right to freely chosen or accepted work, including the right not to be deprived of
work unfairly.”112 States have the obligation to ensure that the “labour market [is]
open to everyone under the jurisdiction of the States parties.”113 The Committee
on ESC Rights took note of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and
gender identity in healthcare, in a general comment, concluding:
Non-discrimination, in the context of the right to sexual and reproductive health,
also encompasses the right of all persons, including lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender and intersex persons, to be fully respected for their sexual orientation,
gender identity and intersex status. . . . State parties . . . have an obligation to
combat homophobia and transphobia, which lead to discrimination, including
violation of the right to sexual and reproductive health.114

State sanctioned discrimination on the basis of transgender status, in
employment and healthcare, clearly violates State Party obligations under
ICESCR. However, the United States has not ratified ICESCR, and has only signed
the Convention. Thus, an additional interpretive step is required to determine the
object and purpose of the Convention and the resulting obligations of signatory
parties.
Scholars have noted that determining the object and purpose of a treaty is a
complicated task, which often results in significant disagreement among States
parties.115 Further complicating the analysis, determining a treaty’s object and
purpose requires an understanding of the term “object and purpose” as utilized in
international law.116 Despite the circularity of the framework used to determine a
treaty’s object and purpose, doing so is critical, especially because holding
powerful State signatories (such as the United States) accountable for human

112. U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, The Right to Work, General
Comment No. 18, para. 4 (35th Sess. 2005).
113. Id. para. 12(b).
114. U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 22 (2016) on
the Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights), General Comment No. 22 (2016).
115. See David S. Jonas & Thomas N. Sanders, The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretive
Methods, 43 VAND. J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. 565, 567 (2010) (alterations in original) (Arguing “object and
purpose is a term of art without a workable definition. Broadly speaking, it refers to a treaty’s essential
goals, as if a treaty’s text could be boiled down to a concentrated broth—the essence of a treaty. Beyond
this general idea, scholars have failed to create a definition with adequate clarity and detail to serve
lawyers who must apply the term in practice. Those who have attempted to do so admit ‘with regret’
that it remains an ‘enigma’ that, ‘[i]nstead of reducing the potential of future conflicts . . . [,] plants the
seed of them.’”).
116. See id. at 577 (Arguing that Vienna Convention rules regarding the interpretation of treaties,
specifically as elaborated upon in Article 31 of the Convention [requiring that treaties be interpreted in
light of their texts, contexts, and objects and purposes] requires an interpretation of “object and
purpose” under Article 31. Further arguing that, based upon the text, context, and teleology of “object
and purpose,” “object and purpose” should be understood as a “unitary concept referring to the goals
that the drafters of the treaty hoped to achieve.” (p. 578)).
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rights violations often depends on the construction of an agreement’s object and
purpose.
Typically, ICESCR’s object and purpose is interpreted, at a minimum, to
include fulfillment of “core obligations”117 and ensuring the “progressive
realization” of economic, social, and cultural rights.118 The Committee on ESC
Rights’ has indicated that States parties to the Convention are bound under the
treaty to ensure fulfillment of ICESCR’s core obligations.119 The text of the
Convention provides, however, that States parties must ensure the progressive
realization of ICESCR obligations.120 Regardless of what these competing
understandings mean for States bound to not take action violative of ICESCR’s
object and purpose, at a minimum, States parties bound by signatory obligations
would be obligated to avoid taking affirmative action to bar equal access to ESC
rights for a discrete group protected under ICESCR.
The transgender service ban is a violation of the United States’ obligations as
an ICESCR signatory party. Under international law, signatory State parties to
ICESCR have the obligation to not take action that would “defeat”121 ICESCR’s
object and purpose. The transgender service ban constitutes state action that
defeats any iteration of ICESCR’s object and purpose. The ban is intended to
arbitrarily prevent members of a marginalized group, who are protected by
ICESCR’s non-discrimination provision, from accessing employment and
healthcare—two rights unequivocally guaranteed by ICESCR—because of their
membership in that group. Military service is employment.122 Additionally, active
duty military personnel, and U.S. veterans are typically eligible to receive fairly
comprehensive healthcare benefits.123 The transgender service ban not only
restricts access to “freely chosen” employment opportunities, but more
importantly, unfairly deprives transgender persons of access to an entire career
path.124 Additionally, the stated rationale for the ban explicitly revolves around the
cost of providing adequate healthcare to transgender persons.125 Such a rationale
and rule deprive transgender persons of access to adequate healthcare, in further
violation of ICESCR obligations.126 Ultimately, whether the object or purpose of
117. Kerstin Mechlem, Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights, 42 VAND. J. OF
TRANSNATIONAL L. 905, 940 (2009).
118. Id. at 942.
119. Id. at 940.
120. See id. at 943 (“Where the implementation of an obligation depends on a considerable amount
of resources, as do some of the proposed core obligations, the text of Article 2(1) does not lend itself to
an interpretation that turns such an obligation into an immediate one.”).
121. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 40, art. 18.
122. See Pay, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: MILITARY COMPENSATION (accessed Dec. 14, 2017),
http://militarypay.defense.gov/Pay/ (describing types of salary received by members of the armed
forces); Careers and Jobs, U.S. ARMY (accessed Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.goarmy.com/careers-andjobs.html (referring to the various “career paths” enlistees in the Army can pursue as “active duty
Soldier[s].”).
123. Health Benefits, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (accessed Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.va.gov
/HEALTHBENEFITS/apply/active_duty.asp.
124. See U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 112.
125. See Presidential Memorandum, supra note 5.
126. See U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 114.
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ICESCR is understood to require immediate fulfillment of minimum core
obligations,127 or progressive realization,128 the transgender service ban—a state
action that affirmatively restricts access to at least two ICESCR core rights—
derogates from the object and purpose of ICESCR, and constitutes a violation of
United States ICESCR obligations as a signatory party.
4. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women.
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women [CEDAW] mandates States parties to the convention “condemn all forms
of discrimination against women”129—defined as—
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise
by women . . . on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other
field.130

CEDAW obligates States parties “[t]o take all appropriate measures,
including legislation,” to eliminate discrimination against women,131 and “ensure
the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing
them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on
a basis of equality with men.”132 Additionally, States parties are obliged to take
measures “[t]o modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and
all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority
of either of the sexes or on stereotypes roles for men and women.”133
Despite CEDAW’s apparent focus on sex discrimination, CEDAW’s TMB, the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, has interpreted
CEDAW’s provisions to cover gender-based discrimination as well.134 The
Committee, while noting that “[i]ntersectionality is a basic concept for
understanding the scope of general obligations of States parties,” concluded that
discrimination against women arises from a multiplicity of identity factors,
including, inter alia, gender identity.135 As a result, States parties to CEDAW have
the obligation to take measures to eliminate intersectional discrimination against
women,136

127. See Mechlem, supra note 117 at 941.
128. See id. at 942.
129. CEDAW, supra note 39, art. 2.
130. Id., art. 1.
131. Id., art. 2.
132. Id., art. 3.
133. Id., art. 5.
134. U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Comment No.
28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women, General Comment No. 28 (2010).
135. Id. at 5, para. 18.
136. Id.
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Similar to ICESCR, the United States has not ratified CEDAW, but signed the
Convention on July 17, 1980.137 Again, as a signing party, the United States has an
obligation under international law to refrain from taking action that would
“defeat”138 the object and purpose of CEDAW. Scholars has noted that
“CEDAW’s object and purpose is likely twofold: the ‘elimination of all forms of
discrimination against women’ and gender equality.”139 Assuming based upon
CEDAW’s language, and interpretations of the Convention’s text by the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, that CEDAW’s
purpose expands beyond mere protection of women against discrimination on the
basis of sex, and extends to protecting women—including women who experience
intersectional discrimination because of their gender identities—from gender and
sex non-conforming gender identity based discrimination, the transgender service
ban would clearly erode the object and purpose of CEDAW, in violation of the
United States’ commitments under the Convention as a signing party.
Even assuming a limited construction of CEDAW’s object and purpose—one
that does not stretch the Convention to include among its recognized forms of
prohibited discrimination, discrimination against members of the transgender
community,140 generally—the transgender service ban still has the effect of
discriminating against women who identify as transgender. In theory, application
of the transgender service ban to individuals who identify as women, but were
assigned male sex at birth (meaning their gender is female), and individuals who
identify as men, but were assigned the female sex at birth and have not had sex
reassignment surgery violates CEDAW’s object and purpose. As discussed above
in relation to the United States’ commitments under ICESCR,141 any affirmative
state action mandating discrimination against women because of their sexual or
gender identities as women, in light of the object and purpose of the Convention,
would necessarily violate a signing party’s obligation to refrain from taking action
that would violate the object and purpose of the Convention. This is true
regardless of whether the object and purpose is defined comprehensively or
narrowly. The transgender service ban is clearly an affirmative government act,
which discriminates against a group of persons, within which women are
included—namely women who identify as transgender (regardless of their
biological sex). Therefore, it violates the United States’ commitments as a signatory
party to CEDAW.
In addition, the transgender service ban is arguably rooted in stereotyped
reasoning about the ways in which men and women should behave—or, gender
stereotypes.142 “By excluding an entire category of people on this characteristic
137. UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, Status of Treaties, (accessed Dec. 21, 2017)
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&clang=_en.
138. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 40, art. 18.
139. Elise Mayer, Designing Women: The Definition of “Woman” in the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 16 CHI. J. UNT’L. L. 533, 579 (2016).
140. For an additional and comprehensive discussion of CEDAW’s general applicability to the
transgender community, see id.
141. See supra notes 121-28.
142. See Doe 1 v. Trump, Civil Action No, 17—1597 (CKK), 2017 WL 4873042, at 28 (D.D.C. Oct. 30,
2017); see also Zack Ford, Federal Judge Suspends Trump’s Transgender Military Ban, THINKPROGRESS (Oct.
30, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/trans-military-injunction-be6139 c6f3e9/.
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alone, the Accession and Retention Directives punish individuals for failing to
adhere to gender stereotypes.”143 Therefore, if the object and purpose of CEDAW
were formulated more broadly to include fostering “gender equality,”144 the
transgender service ban, which is rooted in stereotyped reasoning145 and promotes
gender inequality, would directly contravene the object of fostering equality
between men and women. As a result, a comprehensive human rights based
advocacy strategy should incorporate CEDAW principles and examine potential
advocacy channels, available as a result of CEDAW.
III. A COMPREHENSIVE ADVOCACY STRATEGY TARGETING THE
TRANSGENDER SERVICE BAN
Given the limitations of an advocacy strategy focused exclusively on
domestic litigation146 and legislative change,147 advocacy challenging the
transgender service ban, and other forms of discrimination against the transgender
community, should incorporate applicable international human rights law
instruments and doctrine, as well as efforts directed at international human rights
fora, including relevant treaty monitoring bodies.
First, utilizing an international human rights law framework renders
accessible additional fora through which advocacy may be directed. Most
importantly among these fora are two of the relevant treaty monitoring bodies
discussed above, and specifically the Human Rights Committee. While the United
States has not consented to have individual complaints brought against it in these
bodies,148 the U.S. is obliged to comply with monitoring requirements, which
include taking part in periodic compliance assessments.149 In part, the purpose of
“the reporting process [is to] create[] a basis for constructive dialogue between
States and treaty bodies . . . in fostering effective national implementation of the
international human rights instruments.”150 The reporting process is also designed
to provide States with opportunities to review their compliance with human rights
treaties, and to “facilitate, at the national level, public scrutiny of government
policies and constructive engagement with relevant actors of civil society.”151

143. Id.
144. See Mayer, supra note 139.
145. Doe 1 v. Trump, 2017 WL 4873042, at 28.
146. See supra notes 11-34.
147. See supra note 35.
148. UNITED NATIONS, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (accessed Dec. 21, 2017), https://treaties.un.org
/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4& clang=_en; Optional Protocol to
the convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (accessed
Dec. 21, 2017), https://treaties.un.org /Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg _no=IV-9b&chap
ter=4& clang=_en.
149. United Nations Rep. of the Secretary-General, Compilation of Guidelines on the Form and Content
of Reports to be Submitted by States Parties to the International Human Rights Treaties, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/2/Rev.6 (Jun. 3, 2009).
150. Id. at 5, para. 11.
151. Id. para. 10.
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During recent periodic assessments, civil society groups played an important
role in addressing shortcomings of treaty compliance by the United States.152
[T]hey participate in the preparation of the government’s own reports, lobby at
review sessions, and monitor domestic Convention implementation. CSOs make
their most significant contribution to the review process through the submission
of “shadow reports,” which augment and contextualize the United States’
formal reports by detailing areas where the United States allegedly has failed to
meet its Convention obligations, shedding light on “what is actually happening
on a daily basis to communities of color across the U.S.” 153

The United States is due to complete its fourth periodic review under the
ICCPR in 2019.154 This is particularly important given the timing of U.S. political
cycles, and the anticipated Presidential election in 2020. Completed reports by civil
society organizations and findings by the Human Rights Committee addressing
human rights non-compliance in the United States may encourage officials to
adopt policies aimed at complying with human rights obligations. In particular,
given the relatively high publicity the transgender service ban received,155
explicitly linking the ban to non-compliance with international obligations may
galvanize efforts challenging the Executive Order, and other forms of state
sanctioned discrimination against the transgender community.
Besides advocacy focused on highlighting treaty obligations and noncompliance in treaty monitoring bodies, applying the international human rights
law framework to the transgender service ban has the potential to provide United
Nations’ special procedures mandate holders with a framework for addressing
how the transgender service ban violates international obligations, and how it
relates to more wide-spread discrimination against the transgender community.156
Special procedures “are independent human rights experts with mandates to
report and advise on human rights from a thematic or country-specific
perspective.”157 Simply calling the transgender service ban a violation of
international law, and demonstrating how the ban implicates international
obligations, may attract attention to the more widespread attacks on transgender
152. See generally Bradley Silverman, The Role of Civil Society Organizations in the United States’
Recently-Concluded CERD Review, 40 YALE J. OF INT’L. L. 199 (2015) (describing the role played by civil
society groups during the United States’ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination [CERD] periodic review, including the submission of shadow reports on particular
areas of concern for particular groups.)
153. Id. at 200 (citations omitted).
154. UNITED NATIONS, Reporting Status for the United States of America (accessed Dec. 21, 2017),
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/countries.aspx?CountryCode=USA&Lang=E
N.
155. Chase Strangio. The Fight for Open Transgender Military Service is Only Beginning, ACLU (Dec.
15, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/blog/lgbt-rights/transgender-rights/fight-open-transgender-militaryservice-only-beginning.
156. See Scott Skinner-Thomson, How Trump May Inadvertently Advance Transgender Rights,
SLATE.COM (Nov. 30, 2017), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2017/11/30/how_trump_is_
inadvertently_advancing_transgender_rights.html (Discussing the widespread attacks on transgender
rights by the Trump administration during Donald Trump’s first year in office.).
157. UNITED NATIONS, Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council (accessed Dec. 21, 2017),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx.
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rights within the United States,158 and lead to an examination of the status of
transgender persons in the United States by independent experts.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, by utilizing an international human
rights framework, advocates provide victims of discrimination with additional
opportunities for their voices to be heard and to participate in efforts challenging
the victimization they experience.159 As a central tenant of the human rights
framework, participation ensures that “[p]eople have a right to participate in how
decisions are made regarding protection of their rights.”160 For groups
experiencing discrimination at the hands of their governments, including the
transgender community in the United States, participation guarantees that
marginalized groups are provided with a platform for challenging discrimination
they face, and provides members of the group with a voice to impact changes in
policies effecting them.161 Therefore, utilizing the international human rights law
framework to challenge transgender discrimination provides victims of human
rights violations with an additional benefit, through enabling them to participate
in advocacy and decision-making concerning the rights violations they experience.
IV. CONCLUSION
The international human rights law framework provides advocates
challenging the Trump administration’s discriminatory policies with additional
tools, particularly the core human rights treaties, as well as additional fora,
including most importantly the Human Rights Committee, through which
advocacy may be directed. These additional opportunities for challenging the
ban—or challenging broader discrimination faced by the transgender community
using the transgender service ban as an example of the kind of discrimination
faced by members of the transgender community—are of particular importance
considering the unfavorable state of U.S. law as related to transgender rights, and
U.S. legislative capacity to undo executive action. Additionally, the international
human rights law framework encourages participation in advocacy efforts by
victims of rights violations. Therefore, by challenging transgender discrimination
under the international human rights law framework, victims of gender identity
discrimination will be empowered to direct advocacy against policies threatening
their abilities to equally participate in society. While potential gains under the
human rights framework may be modest and indirect, using human rights law as
a complement to domestic U.S. advocacy strategies challenging transgender

158. See Skinner-Thomson, supra note 154.
159. NATIONAL ECONOMIC & SOCIAL RIGHTS INITIATIVE, What are the Basic Principles of the Human
Rights Framework?, https://www.nesri.org/programs/what-are-the-basic-principles-of-the-humanrights-framework (accessed Dec. 21, 2017).
160. Id.
161. United Nations Human Rights Council: Rep. of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, Progress report on the study on indigenous peoples and the Right to Participate in
Decision-Making, A/HRC/15/25 (Aug. 23, 2010) (discussing the role of participation in international
human rights law instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and how the
right to participation entails collective and personal participation, as well as general and specific forms
of participation in decision-making).
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discrimination will undoubtedly lead to at least modest gains—and modest gains
are gains nonetheless.

